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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been said that "[t]he law of res judicata, much more than most
other segments of law, has rhyme, reason and rhythm - something in
common with good poetry."'
This note will focus on the law of res judicata2 as applied by the state
courts of Ohio regarding decisions handed down by Ohio's administrative
agencies. While there exists a body of law on the federal level pertaining
to administrative resjudicata, 3 which appears to be well settled, 4 the Ohio
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether the decision of an admin-
istrative body will have res judicata effect in a subsequent action in an
'4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 21.8, at 78 (2d ed. 1983).
The preclusive effects of former adjudication are discussed in varying
and, at times seemingly conflicting terminology, attributable to the
evolution of preclusion concepts over the years. These effects are re-
ferred to collectively by most commentators as the doctrine of 'res
judicata' (citations omitted). Res judicata is often analyzed further to
consist of two preclusion concepts: 'issue preclusion' and 'claim pre-
clusion.' Issue preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in fore-
closing relitigation of a matter that has been litigated and decided
(citation omitted). This effect also is referred to as direct or collateral
estoppel. Claim preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in fore-
closing litigation of a matter that never has been litigated, because
of a determination that it should have been advanced in an earlier
suit. Claim preclusion therefore encompasses the law of merger and
bar (citation omitted).
Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984).
Administrative res judicata refers to the concept of applying res judicata
principles to decisions of administrative agencies. See generally 4 K. DAVIS, supra
note 1, at 47.
4 In United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966) (discussed
more fully infra) the Court recognized administrative res judicata. The Court in
recent years has expanded this doctrine. However, it has not decided what effect
should be given to the decision of a state administrative agency in a subsequent
case in state court. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986) (federal
courts must apply res judicata to state administrative agency decisions in the
same manner as the state would).
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Ohio state court.5 This note will suggest that Ohio courts should reject
administrative res judicata where its effect would be to bind the state
courts by a decision rendered by a state administrative agency.
The discussion will begin with an introduction to the concepts of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, the main components of the doctrine of
res judicata.6 This will allow for a better understanding of the principles
which underlie the use of res judicata in our courts. Included in this
discussion is a comparison of res judicata between federal courts and Ohio
courts. In illustrating the differences between the two systems, it will
become clear that to assume Ohio will simply follow the federal courts
may be premature. 7
The next step will be to look at how Ohio's appellate courts have dealt
with the issue. Particular emphasis in this area will be given to Pullar
v. Upjohn Health Care Services, Inc.8 and Distelzweig v. Hawkes Hospital
of Mt. Carmel.9 These two decisions provide a marked contrast in the
Ohio appellate courts comprehension and application of administrative
res judicata. This section is offered to show the difficulty the courts have
had in applying this doctrine.
The procedural and philosophical aspects of administrative adjudica-
tion and state court adjudication will be discussed with an in-depth look
at the similarities and differences between the two systems. By examining
such factors 10 as the underlying policies of the tribunal, standards used
to make decisions, general purpose of existence, the role of stare decisis
in decisions, and the incentive to litigate, it will be suggested that ad-
ministrative tribunals and courts of law do not have sufficient similarities
between them to allow the latter to give res judicata effect to decisions
of the former.
II. HISTORICAL VIEW OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The precise origin of res judicata and collateral estoppel in Anglo-
American law is very difficult to determine. 1 At the time of the first
I The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized administrative res judicata only
where both adjudicating bodies are administrative agencies. See Set Products,
Inc. v. Bainbridge Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 31 Ohio St. 3d 260, 510 N.E.2d
373 (1987); Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio, 16
Ohio St. 3d 9, 475 N.E.2d 782 (1985); Superior's Brand Meats, Inc. v. Lindley, 62
Ohio St. 2d 133, 403 N.E.2d 996 (1980).
6 W. FREEDMAN, RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TooLS FOR PLAIN-
TIFFS AND DEFENDANTS 21 (1988).
1 Cf. F. COOPER, 2 STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 527 (1965), stating "there ap-
pears no reason to doubt that the state courts would follow the federal courts in
showing an inclination to accept administrative determinations of a factual or
textual nature .... "
'21 Ohio App. 3d 288, 488 N.E.2d 486 (1984).
' 34 Ohio App. 3d 277, 518 N.E.2d 43 (1986).
10 When applying resjudicata to administrative agency decisions, consideration
must be given to the constitutional ramifications of such action. The constitutional
issues are beyond the scope of this article. For an in-depth study of the impact
of the Constitution on res judicata, see Vestal, The Constitution and Preclusion!
Res Judicata, 62 MICH. L. REV. 33 (1964).
" A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION 17 (1969). It is clear that by the be-
ginning of the twelfth century res judicata was part of the law of England. Millar,
The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata, 35 ILL. L. REV. 41,
44 (1941).
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reported cases using these doctrines, the English courts employed many
different sources to determine the law which would control any given
situation. 12 A number of these sources are believed to be major factors in
the development of the modern concepts of preclusion.'
3
Germanic law and tradition were among the controlling influences upon
the court at this time.14 It is believed the concept of collateral estoppel
was derived from these influences. 15 The Germanic principle did not con-
cern itself with the judgment qua judgment but instead relied upon some
aspect of the record proceedings anterior to judgment as its operative
basis. 1
6
The operation of the preclusion in this manner became known as es-
toppel by record because of the emphasis which was placed on the record.
This emphasis was created by a "notion of inviolableness of the record"'
7
which excluded any attempt to contradict its contents. Estoppel by record,
it has been argued, preceded the introduction of the concept of res judicata
in English law.'
While common law courts did not cite the Roman law with any fre-
quency in the early centuries, 9 the Roman principles had some effect on
the law being used in England.2 0 Under Roman law, an earlier adjudi-
cation was conclusive in a second suit which involved the same main
issue and legal basis, but when a judgment was rendered in a personal
matter it had no effect on subsequent litigation dealing with different
subject matter.2 ' This Roman principle has developed into what are now
known as the concepts of merger and bar.
22
Today's perception of collateral estoppel and res judicata as belonging
to the general concept of res judicata is the result of an abolishment of
both pleading differences, and the requirement that record proof establish
the estoppel.23 Because the basis of the preclusion was the statements of
the party, and not the judgment of the court, as in res judicata, the action
was termed an estoppel.
24
12 A. VESTAL, supra note 11, at 17.
11 In addition to German and Roman law, the law merchant, the canon courts
and canonical law are believed to have had an impact on the English courts' view
of res judicata. Id. at 16-17.
14 Id. at 17.
11 W. FREEDMAN, supra note 6, at 7. See generally Millar, supra note 11.
16 The "Germanic prototype, did not depend at all upon the fact of judgment,
... in a proper case a man might be estopped by the proceedings in a former suit
whether this had gone to judgment or not." Millar, supra note 11, at 53-54.
17 Id. at 45.
8Id.
A. VESTAL, supra note 11, at 19.
20 Id. at 19-20.
21 Developments in the Law - Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 820 (1952)
[hereinafter Developments]. See also Millar, supra note 11, at 52.
22 Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Limiting The Preclusive Effect
Of Administrative Determinations In Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 422,
426 (1983). See Developments, supra note 21, at 820.
1 See Developments, supra note 21, at 821. The Roman and Germanic doctrines
despite their interrelationship were considered to be separate and distinct in
judicial and academic discussion. This led to much confusion in terminology. Id.
I Id. at 820. The statements of the party were contained in the record which
is where the term "estoppel by record" originated. See Millar, supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
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These concepts were recognized by the American courts in the Cromwell
v. County of Sac decision.25 In that nineteenth century case, the United
States Supreme Court laid the foundation for the American application
of these two doctrines.
26
III. RATIONALE FOR RES JUDICATA
The application of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
is "central to the purpose for which civil courts have been established. '27
The purpose is one of allowing courts to conclusively resolve disputes
within their jurisdiction. 28
By applying preclusion principles, the parties in an adversarial
proceeding2 9 are protected from the expense and vexation caused by mul-
tiple lawsuits.30 If parties were allowed indefinite continuation of dis-
putes, issues or claims, burdens would be cast on society." Time and
energy which could be put to better use would be wasted. In addition, the
disputatious would be rewarded by a system which places the transactions
of the day on uncertain premises.3 2 Res judicata and collateral estoppel
principles are designed to further the purpose noted above by finalizing
court judgments and increasing respect for and reliance on judicial de-
cisions.3
3
While res judicata principles have been justified on the grounds of
judicial economy, this does not appear to be a strong reason for applying
collateral estoppel. In most instances, collateral estoppel does not save
as much time or money as res judicata because only the number of issues
and not the size of the court docket are reduced.3 4
25 94 U.S. 351 (1876).26 Perschbacher, supra note 22, at 429.
U.S. v. Montana, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
28JId. at 153.
2 See S. LANDSMAN, infra note 168 and accompanying text.
30 Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54.
3' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, introduction at 11 (1982). Res judi-
cata had been described as, "the quintessence of the law itself: A convention
designed to compensate for man's incomplete knowledge and strong tendency to
quarrel." Id.3
1 Id. at 11-12.
33 Southern Pacific R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897). In Southern
Pacific, Justice Harlan speaking of the goals sought in applying res judicata
stated:
This general rule is demanded by the very object for which civil
courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose
of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determi-
nation. Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order:
for the aid ofjudicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication
of rights of person and property, if, as between parties and their pri-
vies, conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals
in respect of all matters properly put in issue and actually determined
by them.
Id. at 49.
34See Perschbacher, supra note 22, at 445-48.
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IV. MECHANICS OF RES JUDICATA
The principle of res judicata used by courts consists of three separate
elements: collateral estoppel,3 5 merger,
36 and bar.3 7
The classic definition of collateral estoppel was provided by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1877:
Where the second action between the same parties is upon a
different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or
points controverted, upon the determination of which the find-
ing or verdict was rendered ... Only upon such matters is the
judgment conclusive in another action .3
In applying collateral estoppel, the federal courts have taken into ac-
count such factors as (1) full and fair opportunity to be heard;39 (2) validity
and finality of the prior judgment;40 (3) changes in circumstance between
the time of the first and second action; 41 (4) substantive or procedural law
of the forum;42 (5) full faith and credit;43 (6) difficulty in obtaining
evidence44; (7) identity of issues;45 and (8) identity of parties. 46
Until 197 1, 4 the federal courts required mutuality of parties before
collateral estoppel could preclude litigation of an issue. In 1971, the U.S.
Supreme Court48 rejected this long standing requirement saying "it is
apparent that the uncritical acceptance of the principal of mutuality...
is today out of place. '14 Today, the federal courts will look at the facts
For a general discussion of collateral estoppel see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 and comments (1982).
36Id. at § 18.
37 See id. at § 19.
31 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1877).
31 See Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
40 See Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 165 N.E.
456 (1929) (finality is established when rights and interests established by the
first judgment would be destroyed by litigation of the second action).
" See W. FREEDMAN, supra note 6, at 22.
42 Id.
-3 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
- Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 356 (1877).
4" See, e.g., Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969)
(there must be identity of issues for collateral estoppel).
46 Cf. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313, 324 (1971).
47 The doctrine of mutuality of parties was being eroded by the state courts
prior to this time. In the leading case of Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust
and Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), the California Supreme Court
unanimously rejected the requirement of mutuality. The court focused, instead,
on whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the one
presented in the action in question, whether there was a final judgment on the
merits and whether the party against whom the plea is asserted is a party or in
privity with a party to the earlier adjudication. Id. at 813, 122 F.2d at 895. The
impact of Bernhard on state and federal courts, over the years, has been tre-
mendous. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313, 324 (1971).
48 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).49 Id. at 350.
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and circumstances of each case to determine whether mutuality is re-
quired.50
Merger and bar, which together form the concept of res judicata or
claim preclusion, preclude the litigation of a claim if a final judgment
has been rendered previously by a court of competent jurisdiction on the
same cause of action between the same parties.51 When applying claim
preclusion, the court will look at factors similar to those used when ap-
plying collateral estoppel. 52
Ohio has recognized the concept of res judicata 51 as involving the doc-
trines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. While Ohio relies on the
Restatement 54 and Cromwell v. County of Sac55 to fashion definitions of
these concepts which appear to be almost identical to the federal model,5
the application of these principles with respect to mutuality is not the
same.
In Goodson v. McDonough Power Equipment Inc.,57 the Ohio Supreme
Court expressed its view that "Ohio has continued the requirement of
mutuality for the application of collateral estoppel, as a general principle,
even though recognizing the view of other states." '58 In doing so, Ohio
explicitly rejects the arguments of the federal courts and other states that
by not requiring mutuality there will be a reduction in the amount of
litigation. 59
V. OHIO CASE LAW
In the 1980 decision, Superior's Brand Meats, Inc. v. Lindley,6 0 the Ohio
Supreme Court addressed, for the first time, the issue of whether the
60 See United States v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 726 (D. Nev.
1962), stating, "[t]he rule of non-mutuality is not a general one but a limited one
to be determined from the facts and circumstances in each case whether or not
it should be applied."
11 Under the doctrine of merger when a plaintiff recovers a final and validjudgment, the original claim is extinguished and the judgment is substituted for
it. In this situation if the plaintiff attempts to assert the same claim the defendant
can use the prior judgment as a defense, or a bar against the plaintiff bringing
the action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18, 19 (1982).
12 For a list and comprehensive discussion of the factors the court will consider,
see W. FREEDMAN, supra note 6, at 11-30.
Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 443 N.E.2d
978 (1983). See Trautwein v. Sorgenfrei, 58 Ohio St. 2d 493, 391 N.E.2d 326
(1979); Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969);
Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E.2d 67 (1943).
Whitehead, 20 Ohio St. 2d at 112, 254 N.E.2d at 13.
55Id.
16 Compare Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 306, 52 N.E. 67, 71 (1943)
(an existing judgment is conclusive of rights, questions and facts in issue, and
that a fact which was in issue in a former action may not be questioned in a
future action) with Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (a finaljudgment bars subsequent claims on the same cause of action and once an issue
has been determined that determination is final).
17 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983).
Id. at 198, 443 N.E.2d at 984.9ld. at 198, 443 N.E.2d at 983.
6 62 Ohio St. 2d 133, 403 N.E.2d 996 (1980).
[Vol. 37:4
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doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to decisions rendered by adminis-
trative bodies.6' In Superior's Brand Meats, the Board of Tax Appeals
affirmed the Tax Commissioner's order assessing Superior taxes and pen-
alties. A portion of the assessment was for the components of a cold storage
building. Subsequently, Superior filed an application for a tax refund. In
its application, Superior stated that the components of the cold storage
building were exempt from the tax. Upon denial of this application, Su-
perior again appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals. Upon this appeal the
Commissioner raised the defense of collateral estoppel. He argued that
the issue was resolved previously when the Board first affirmed the order
of the Commissioner assessing the taxes. The court in affirming this use
of collateral estoppel stated:
We recognize the need for flexibility in applying the doctrine
of collateral estoppel to the administrative decision-making
process; however, because of the need for finality, we hold that
ordinarily where an administrative proceeding is of a judicial
nature and where the parties have had an adequate opportu-
nity to litigate the issues involved in the proceeding, the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel may be used to bar litigation of
issues in a second administrative proceeding.
62
It should be kept in mind, however, that in Superior Brand Meats, as
well as the other two cases in which the Ohio Supreme Court has ad-
dressed this issue,6 3 both adjudicatory bodies were administrative in na-
ture.
While the Ohio Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether
a finding by a state administrative agency should be given res judicata
affect in a subsequent action in state court, Ohio's appellate courts have
had occasion to address the issue.6
In Pullar v. Upjohn Health Care Services, Inc.,65 the Cuyahoga County
Court of Appeals found that collateral estoppel does apply to prevent the
litigation in state court of an issue previously determined by an admin-
61 The court stated, "[t]his court must decide whether the doctrine of collateral
estoppel can be applied to decisions rendered by administrative bodies. This is a
question this court has not faced squarely in the past." Id. at 135, 403 N.E.2d at
999.
62 Id. at 135, 403 N.E.2d at 999.
Set Prods., Inc. v. Bainbridge Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 31 Ohio St.
3d 260, 510 N.E.2d 373 (1987) (both actions were before the zoning board). Office
of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio, 16 Ohio St. 3d 9, 475
N.E.2d 782 (1985) (where the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had determined
that an electric company had correctly calculated its rates a subsequent action
before the same commission relating to those rates is barred).
"See Luka v. Sherwin-Williams Co., No. 54627 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga
County Nov. 10, 1988) (1988 WESTLAW 121059); Walters v. City of Brecksville,
No. 53660 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County Apr. 21, 1988) (1988 WESTLAW
38111); Dean v. Miami Valley Hospital, Inc., CA 1039 (Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery
County Feb. 22, 1988) (LEXIS, Ohio Library); Wilson v. Hatter, No. CA 85-04-
014, (Ohio Ct. App. Warren County June 23, 1986); Distelzweig v. Hawkes Hos-
pital of Mount Carmel, 34 Ohio App. 3d 277, 518 N.E.2d 43 (Franklin County
1986); Pullar v. Upjohn Health Care Serv., Inc., 21 Ohio App. 3d 288, 488 N.E.2d
486 (Cuyahoga County 1984).
" 21 Ohio App. 3d 288, 488 N.E.2d 486 (1984).
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istrative agency. In Pullar, the appellant, upon being discharged from
her place of employment, instituted an action against appellees charging
them with discharge in violation of a state age discrimination statute,6
as well as breach of contract and wrongful discharge.6 7 Appellant, in
addition, filed for unemployment compensation in connection with this
loss of employment. The referee of the Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review found that there was just cause for appellant's discharge.
The referee found that the discharge was the result of appellant's failure
to follow a written order given by her employer.8 The trial court held
that the denial of unemployment benefits, on the grounds that the dis-
charge was for just cause, precluded appellant from raising a claim as a
result of her discharge.6 9 The court of appeals affirmed, holding "it has
already been established in a prior administrative hearing that the ap-
pellant's discharge was based on her refusal to follow orders. Therefore,
it follows that her discharge could not be based on her age."70 In addition,
it held that because of the decision of the referee "she cannot now claim
an action for wrongful discharge."'"
In Pullar, the appellant argued that findings under such a relaxed and
abbreviated procedure as that used in the context of an unemployment
compensation hearing should not be given res judicata effect. 72 She also
argued that a referee's determination in such a proceeding may be based
on evidence which would be inadmissible in a court of law and as such
she would be denied her day in court.7 3 The Pullar court rejected these
arguments based on the fact that appellant was provided with the rules
needed to appeal her claim and did in fact appeal to the board of review.74
In addition, the Pullar court explicitly accepted the holding of the U.S.
Supreme Courtv5 which acceptance was based on the interest in finality
of litigation.76 The breach of contract action was held by the court to be
barred by the Statute of Frauds.7 7
66OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.17 (A) (Baldwin 1983) provides in part: "[n]o
employer shall ... discharge without just cause any employee between the ages
of forty and seventy ......
61 It was claimed that the discharge was the result of the appellant commu-
nicating to doctors malfunctions in the pacemakers she was selling. 21 Ohio App.
3d at 288, 488 N.E.2d at 487.
Id. at 289, 488 N.E.2d at 488.
'9 Id. at 289, 488 N.E.2d at 488.70 Id. at 291, 488 N.E.2d at 489.711d. at 295, 488 N.E.2d at 494.
72 Id. at 293, 488 N.E.2d at 492. For a discussion of the procedures used at an
unemployment compensation hearing see generally, 54 0. JuR. 2d Unemployment
Compensation.
73 21 Ohio App. 3d at 293, 486 N.E.2d at 492.74 Id. at 294, 486 N.E.2d 492. The Pullar court, in rejecting the argument that
as a result of using evidence which would be inadmissible in court the plaintiff
is being denied an opportunity to be heard, relied on Gear v. Des Moines, 514 F.
Supp. 1218 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (to apply administrative res judicata the litigants
in the administrative adjudication must have been notified, heard, introduced
evidence and afforded an opportunity to seek court review).
75 21 Ohio App. 3d at 292, 486 N.E.2d at 490. The court accepted the holding
of United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966) (dis-
cussed infra.).
76 Pullar, 21 Ohio App. 3d at 292, 486 N.E.2d at 290 (quoting Superior's Brand
Meats, Inc. v. Lindley, 62 Ohio St. 2d 133 at 135, 403 N.E.2d 996, 999 (1980)).
Ohio's Statute of Frauds is provided in OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1335.05
(Baldwin 1982).
[Vol. 37:4
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A case which illustrates the uncertainty of the law of administrative
res judicata in Ohio was decided in 1986 by the Franklin County Court
of Appeals in Distelzweig v. Hawkes Hospital of Mount Carmel.78 In Dis-
telzweig, plaintiff was employed as a nurse by defendant, Hawkes Hos-
pital, under the terms of an employment contract. During the term of the
contract, plaintiff was discharged for refusing to wear a nursing cap.
Plaintiff subsequently applied for and was initially awarded unemploy-
ment compensation benefits. These benefits, however, were denied based
on the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review's finding that she
was discharged from her employment for just cause within the meaning
of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation law.
79
In addition to the claim for unemployment benefits, plaintiff brought
action against defendant for breach of a written employment contract for
a specified duration. 0 In defense of this action, the employer asserted
that an employer may discharge an employee for just cause without in-
curring liability in Ohio despite a written employment contract.81 Thus,
defendants argued, since the Unemployment Compensation Board of Re-
view previously found that the discharge was for just cause, plaintiff
should be collaterally estopped from bringing the breach of contract ac-
78 34 Ohio App. 3d 277, 518 N.E.2d 43 (1986). See also Walters v. City of
Brecksville, No. 53660 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County Apr. 21, 1988) (1988
WESTLAW 38111). In Walters, the court was faced with a situation which was
somewhat different than that in Pullar or Distelzweig. The difference lies in the
fact that in Walters the decision of the administrative agency was appealed to
the common pleas court. In Pullar and Distelzweig, there was no such appeal of
the agency's decision. This is significant because under normal applications of
res judicata the decision of the reviewing court would preclude subsequent liti-
gation of the same claim in another court.
In Walters, the court, which was the same one that decided Pullar, was faced
with the issue of whether the trial court's affirmation of an administrative agen-
cy's decision is resjudicata in a subsequent civil action. The plaintiff, Mr. Walters,
was discharged from his employment as a fireman. He then filed a claim appealing
his discharge with the Civil Service Commission. The Commission dismissed his
appeal; the dismissal was affirmed by the court of common pleas. Mr. Walters
then commenced civil action against his employer, the city of Brecksville, and an
official thereof. The complaint asserted seven causes of action: breach of contract,
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, age discrimination, violation
of public policy, violation of federal civil rights, intentional infliction of emotional
injury and promissory estoppel. The trial court dismissed this action. The trial
court concluded that because the common pleas court affirmed the Civil Service
Commission decision, the plaintiff was precluded from bringing this action.
On appeal, the court rejected the claim of res judicata. The court in Walters
held that the Civil Service Commission was not empowered to look into the
underlying reason for the discharge, they could only examine whether the dis-
charge was procedurally correct. Perhaps more significantly, the court placed
great weight on the fact that the plaintiff could not have received the same remedy
in his administrative action as he was asking for in the civil action. It is interesting
to note that in Pullar the remedy sought in the civil action was not the same as
that which was available in the administrative action.
1 34 Ohio App. 3d at 277, 518 N.E.2d at 44.
Id., 518 N.E.2d at 44. The contract was for the period of one year, during
which time the plaintiff was to work as a part-time nursing instructor.
811 Id., 518 N.E.2d at 44. See, e.g., Dayton Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Brown, 116 Ohio
St. 373, 156 N.E. 136 (1927).
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tion.12 While the trial court accepted this contention in granting summary
judgment for defendant, the appellate court did not.
The court in Distelzweig refused to apply collateral estoppel to the
decision made by the Unemployment Board of Review because the issues
were not identical. The court held that a finding that plaintiff was dis-
charged for just cause under the Ohio unemployment compensation law
is not the same as a finding that she was discharged for just cause as
that term applies to the law governing a written employment contract.8 3
The court found that:
While there will be an overlap of factual questions as well as
similarities in the presentation of evidence and testimony, the
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to a mere overlap
of issues. To apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel in such a
situation would be to deny plaintiff her right to due process as
well as her right to a jury trial.84
In addition, the Distelzweig court placed importance on the fact that it
was not foreseeable to plaintiff that as a result of the board's determi-
nation of just cause she would be precluded from litigating her breach of
contract action.8 5
The Distelzweig court did not explicitly reject Pullar v. Upjohn 6 but
rather distinguished it on the ground that the plaintiff in Pullar was
barred from litigating the subsequent action in state court because the
oral contract, at issue in that case, did not comply with the Statute of
Frauds. 7
While the court in Distelzweig did not, on its face, reject the decision
in Pullar, at least one Ohio court ss has found these two decisions to be
irreconcilable in their application of administrative res judicata.
In Dean v. Miami Valley Hospital, Inc., the Montgomery County Court
of Appeals chose the approach used by the Distelzweig court while ex-
plicitly rejecting the decision of the Pullar court.8 9 In Dean, the court was
faced with the issue of whether a determination by the Unemployment
Board of Review, that an employee was not terminated for just cause,
precludes the litigation of the issue in a subsequent breach of contract
12 The claim of the defendant is that "the just cause issue decided by the board
is the exact issue which would be determinative as to the resolution of plaintiffs
action for breach of contract." Distelzweig, 34 Ohio App. 3d at 278, 518 N.E.2d
at 44.
Id. at 279, 518 N.E.2d at 46.
8Id.
a5Id.
1 21 Ohio App. 3d 288, 488 N.E.2d 486 (1984).
87 The court in Distelzweig states, "[tihe Pullar case is inapplicable because
the plaintiff in Pullar was not collaterally estopped from litigating the breach of
contract action but was barred from litigating the action because the oral contract
did not comply with the Statute of Frauds." Distelzweig, 34 Ohio App. 3d at 279,
518 N.E.2d at 45. While it is true that the plaintiff in Pullar failed to comply
with the Statute of Frauds, based on the statement of the Pullar court, that,
"appellant is estopped from relitigating the issue of the cause of her discharge
because the findings of the referee... concluded that the appellant was discharged
for [just cause]," Pullar, 21 Ohio App. 3d at 295, 488 N.E.2d at 494, it is ques-
tionable whether Distelzweig's basis for distinction is completely accurate.
88 Dean v. Miami Valley Hosp., Inc., No. CA 10391 (Ohio Ct. App. Montgomery
County Feb. 22, 1988) (LEXIS, Ohio library).
19 Id. at 18.
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action. This is essentially the same issue that was determined in Pullar9 0
and Distelzweig.9 1
The court in Dean held that the agency's decision does not preclude the
breach of contract action. The court, in so holding, accepted the Distel-
zweig court's belief that the standard to be used to determine "just cause"
in the administrative hearing is not the same as that used in an action
for breach of contract.9 2 The court, in Dean, looked at the policy impli-
cations of allowing the agency's decision res judicata effect. The court
stated that if resjudicata were allowed in such a situation "[a]n employer
could not afford to allow an application for benefits to go uncontested. 9 3
In addition, the court found that legislative intent could not have been
to allow the administrative agency to decide contract issues .
4
VI. SUPREME COURT
In the 1940 case of Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins95 the United
States Supreme Court, for the first time, allowed the decision of an ad-
ministrative agency to have preclusive effect in a subsequent judicial
action. Prior to this time, the Court was unwilling to apply res judicata
to an administrative agency's determinations. The Court previously rec-
ognized decisions rendered by administrative bodies as decisions of the
executive department and as such, immune from the application of the
doctrine of res judicata. 16 The Court's rationale for not accepting admin-
istrative res judicata during this era was predicated on a concern for the
way in which the agencies arrived at decisions. The Court felt that these
decisions were rendered in a summary way so as to obtain the objectives
of the administrative body.9 7 In addition, the Court expressed concern
over the lack of ability of an administrative body to compel the attendance
of witnesses.9 8
The full acceptance by the Supreme Court- of the concept of admin-
istrative res judicata can be traced to the Court's decision in United States
v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.100 The dispute in Utah Construction
arose out of a construction contract entered into between Utah Construc-
tion, as contractor, and the United States, for the construction of a facility
for the Atomic Energy Commission. The contract provided for an exten-
sion of time or an equitable adjustment of the contract price in the event
of government orders permitting changes in the work or if materially
different conditions were encountered by the contractor. Under the terms
of the contract, any disputes which arose were to be decided by the con-
tracting officers whose decision was to be final and conclusive. The con-
10 Pullar, 21 Ohio App. 3d 288, 488 N.E.2d 486 (1984).
9 Distelzweig, 34 Ohio App. 3d 277, 518 N.E.2d 43 (1986). Unlike Pullar and
Distelzweig, however, the employee in Dean is the party who wants res judicata
principles to apply.
92 Dean, No. CA 10391, at 11.93 Id. at 15.
"Id. at 16. The Dean court found the Unemployment Board's function is to
determine whether benefits should be granted.
"310 U.S. 381 (1940).
Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281, 285 (1906).
w Id.
98 Id.
"United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
'0 Pershbacher, supra note 22, at 433.
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tracting officer's decision could then be appealed to the Advisory Board
of Contract Appeals. If unsatisfied with the decision of the Board, a breach
of contract action could be brought in either the Court of Claims or the
District Court. By statutory mandate, 01 the finality with which these
courts were to accord the fact finding of the Board was limited to a review
of the record made at the time of the appeal. 10 2 The Board's decision was
to be struck down only if it was "fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or
so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith or is not supported
by substantial evidence.' ' 0 3 In no event, however, was the court to make
a de novo determination of the facts. 0 4
The contractor in Utah Construction, filed claims with the contracting
officer pursuant to the changed conditions portion of the contract. 0 5 The
Board, upon appeal, found as to the first claim, that the changed condi-
tions did not occur as a result of the cause alleged and as to the second
claim, that no changed conditions occurred within the meaning of the
contract. The contractor subsequently brought action for breach of con-
tract in the Court of Claims. 0 6 The Court of Claims held that they had
power to conduct a de novo review of the breach of contract claim because
the dispute clause of the contract limited the authority of the Board to a
dispute over the rights given by the contract, not to a dispute over a
violation of the contract. 0 7
The Supreme Court, on appeal, reversed the decision of the Court of
Claims as to its failure to give finality to the factual findings of the Board.
The Court based its decision on the terms of the contract.', Although the
facts of the case had little to do with res judicata,0 9 the Court stated that:
Occasionally, courts have used language to the effect that res
judicata principles do not apply to administrative proceedings,
but such language is certainly too broad. When an adminis-
trative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves dis-
puted issues of fact properly before it which the parties have
had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not
hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose."10
101 Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1964 ed.).
102 Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. at 400.
103 Id. at 399 (quoting Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1964)).
104 The Court found in United States v. Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963),
that where an administrative decision is challenged in a breach of contract action,
Congress did not intend a de novo determination of the facts to be made by the
courts. Id.
1o A "Pier Drilling" claim was filed which asked for an adjustment of the
contract price and an extension of time. Also, a "Shield Window" claim asserted
the existence of changed conditions and asked for additional compensation and
time. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. at 400-01.
IN The Court of Claims action was for breach of contract by reason of the
government's unreasonable delay. The recovery sought was delay damages. Id.
at 401.
107 Id. at 401.
101 The disputes clause of the contract limited the Board's authority to "disputes
concerning questions of fact arising under this contract." Id. at 401.
109 For an in-depth analysis of Utah Construction & Mining Co., see Morris,
infra note 114, at 208.
"I Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. at 421-22.
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Legal commentators have argued that the Court's statement relying
on res judicata is at best an alternative holding and in fact may simply
be dicta."' However, lower federal courts" 2 and state courts, including
Ohio, 1 3 have relied on this language to apply res judicata to decisions of
administrative agencies.
More recently, in University of Tenn. v. Elliott,"4 the Supreme Court
had an opportunity to expand the scope of the holding in Utah Construc-
tion. The issue presented in Elliott was whether the decision of a state
administrative law judge, that respondent was not discharged as a result
of racially motivated prejudice, precludes action in federal court based
on a violation of various civil rights laws."15
In Elliott, respondent was discharged for misconduct at work and in-
adequate work performance. Respondent requested and received a hear-
ing under state law.1 1 6 The adjudication was conducted by an
administrative assistant to the vice president of the department in which
respondent had worked. After listening to evidence in an extensive hear-
ing,' 17 the administrative assistant, who was acting as an administrative
law judge, held that some of the charges made against respondent were
proven and that they were not racially motivated. On appeal to the vice
president, the initial findings were affirmed. Prior to the hearing with
the administrative assistant, respondent filed an action in federal court
to claim violations of certain civil rights statutes. This action was not
heard until the completion of respondent's administrative appeal, at
which time the district court granted petitioner's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the decision by the administrative law
judge should be given preclusive effect in a subsequent action in federal
court based on civil rights statutes."18 The district court reasoned that
the civil rights statutes were not designed to provide a plaintiff with a
means of re-litigating that which the plaintiff had previously litigated.119
After the Court of Appeals reversed,120 the Supreme Court issued a rule
of preclusion which could apply to every action brought in federal court.
The Court expanded Utah Construction beyond the res judicata effects of
federal administrative agency decisions on subsequent court actions. The
"I Pershbacher, supra note 22, at 434.
112 Id.
112 Pullar v. Upjohn Health Care Serv., Inc., 21 Ohio App. 3d 288, 488 N.E.2d
486 (1984).
114 238 U.S. 288 (1986). For an intensive study of the Court's decision in Elliott
see Morris, How Many Bites Are Enough? The Supreme Court's Decision in Uni-
versity of Tennessee v. Elliott, 55 TENN. L. REV. 205 (1988).
"' The action was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1982), as well as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986
and 1988. See University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 790 n.1 (1986).
116 University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 790 (1986). The hearing was
allowed pursuant to TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-101 (1985). University of Tenn. v.
Elliott, 478 U.S. at 791 n.1 (1986).
"I The hearing took place over more than five months, more than 100 witness
and 150 exhibits were involved and it generated over 5,000 pages of transcript.
University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 791 n.2 (1986).
"' Elliott v. University of Tenn., 641 F. Supp. 24 (W.D. Tenn. 1984).
"'Id. at 27.
"' Elliott v. University of Tenn., 766 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1985).
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Elliott Court stated that when a state agency is acting in the judicial
capacity required by Utah Construction, "federal courts must give the
agency's fact finding the same preclusive effect to which it would be
entitled in the state's courts.' 12' The Court was of the opinion that giving
this res judicata effect to an administrative tribunal's decisions would
serve the values of federalism, 12 2 and "act as a nationally unifying
force ."123
While the Court may have expanded its concept of administrative res
judicata, it is clear from Elliott that they have stopped short of estab-
lishing an absolute rule of preclusion to be applied by state courts in
regard to decisions handed down by state administrative agencies, opting
instead, to rely on the lower state and federal courts' decisions in this
regard.12
4
VII. RESTATEMENT
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments takes a position regarding
administrative res judicata which is similar to that taken by the United
States Supreme Court. The Restatement's view is that, generally, res
judicata should be applied to decisions by an administrative tribunal in
the exact manner in which the doctrine would be applied to the judgments
of a court of law.125 This approach advocates the application of resjudicata
without regard to whether the subsequent action is another proceeding
in the same or different administrative setting as the initial action or
whether it takes place in a judicial tribunal. 26
The approach taken by the Restatement is not one requiring absolute
application of res judicata principles to the whole multitude of decisions
handed down by administrative agencies. 127 The Restatement recognizes
that statutes, which are applicable in given situations, may contemplate
that the decisions of a particular administrative agency are not to be
given res judicata effect outside of that agency. 128
The Restatement additionally provides, as a prerequisite to the appli-
cation of administrative res judicata, that the initial administrative pro-
ceeding entail "the essential elements of adjudication."' 1 2 This
121 University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S 788, 798 (1986). However, while the
Court held that as to the Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Statutes, including 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 (1982), a preclusion rule could be
formulated, they refused to allow state administrative proceedings to have pre-
clusive effect on Title VII claims. Id. at 788, 795. In so holding with regard to
Title VII actions, the Court was following the decision in Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982), where it was held that although final statejudgments are entitled to full faith and credit in Title VII actions, unreviewed
determination by state agencies do not. Id. at 470.
122 University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798 (1986).
1 Id. at 799 (quoting Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 289
(1980)).
124 Id.
125 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(1) (1982).
128 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 Comment a (1982).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2) (1982).
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requirement is satisfied under the terms of the Restatement if: (1) ade-
quate notice is provided to all persons who are to be bound by the ad-
ministrative proceeding; 130 (2) the parties are given the right to present
evidence and legal arguments in order to support this position or rebut
the evidence and legal arguments presented by the opposing parties;
131
(3) issues of law and fact are formulated so as to apply to specific parties
in specific circumstances; 132 and 4) a rule is given by the agency which
establishes the point in the process where the decision is final. 133 More-
over, the size and intricacy of the dispute, the opportunity to obtain evi-
dence and frame legal arguments, and the requisite speed with which
the matter must be resolved 34 are all factors which must be considered
in determining whether a given proceeding contains the elements of ad-
judication which are essential under the Restatement to the application
of res judicata to decisions of administrative agencies. The presence of
the aforementioned elements in a proceeding is not prima facie evidence
of an adjudication of the type necessary under the Restatement for the
application of res judicata. A legal claim to specific relief must also be
present.
35
The Restatement, in applying administrative res judicata, is not con-
cerned with whether the administrative proceedings have an objective
which is paramount to the determination of a claim. Its primary concern
is whether an issue is expressed and determined in a manner analogous
to that which exists in a court of law.136 The Restatement is additionally
concerned with advancing the general policies which underlie the basic
concepts of res judicata. 13 7
Certain factors are recognized by the Restatement as mitigating
against the use of res judicata in situations which would initially appear
to warrant the use of the doctrine.13 8 One such factor to take cognizance
of is the amount in controversy. It may be contrary to our concepts of
fairness to preclude the re-litigation of an issue where the amount in
controversy in the initial administrative proceeding is considerably
smaller than the amount in controversy in the subsequent court action. 139
See id. § 83(2)(a).
See id. § 83(2)(b).
132 See id. § 83(2)(c).
133 See id. § 83(2)(d).
134 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2)(e).
131 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 comment b (1982).
1"6 "The essential question is whether, within the context of the larger purpose
of an administrative proceeding, an issue is formulated as it would be in a court
and decided according to procedures similar to those of a court." Id.
137 Id. For a discussion of the policies underlying res judicata, see supra notes
27-34 and accompanying text.
136 Courts and commentators have recognized the need to maintain flexibility
in applying res judicata. An example of a situation where a court must exercise
restraint is where the two actions involve claims which are totally unrelated.
The danger also exists that a party, because of preclusion, may feel compelled to
over-litigate out of fear of the consequences in a later action. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS Title E Introductory Note at 249 (1982).
139 See infra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
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There is also a provision in the Restatement which explicitly enumerates
exceptions to the application of res judicata. 140
VIII. POLICY AND PHILOSOPHY
The Unites States Supreme Court and the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments both focus heavily on the procedural aspects of adjudication
when analyzing whether to give res judicata effect to determinations
made by administrative agencies.1 4 ' Under this approach, if the proce-
dures adhered to by the administrative agency are similar to those em-
ployed by a court of law, the decision of the agency will be given preclusive
effect in the subsequent judicial action.142 Neither the Supreme Court nor
any other legal authority has been able to define exactly what procedures
are essential for the application of administrative res judicata 4 1 The
decisions handed down by the various state and federal courts have been
ad hoc, dependant on the facts of the individual case.1 44 Lack of a definitive
standard of procedure is consistent with the situation encountered when
determining whether a litigant has been granted his constitutionally
required procedure in a court of law.145
Although some procedure is required by an administrative agency act-
ing in a judicial capacity to allow it to resemble a court, this should not
be the sole inquiry made in determining whether to recognize adminis-
trative res judicata. Other factors which must be examined include pur-
pose of the agency, incentive to litigate, 47 remedies available 48 and
the substantive law as the basis of decision. 49 It is when these factors
are taken into consideration that the goals underlying res judicata are
achieved. 
50
State agencies generally do not have the internal structure or intra-
agency procedural consistency of agencies operated by the federal gov-
ernment.'5' The adjudicatory procedures which are followed by federal
140 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 20 (exceptions to claim pre-
clusion), 28 (issue preclusion) and 83(3) (4) (administrative res judicata) (1982).
141 See supra notes 110, 125-35 and accompanying text.
142 See 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 21.3, at 53.
141 It is common for courts to simply quote the language used by the court in
United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966),
where the court said that res judicata applies "[w]hen an administrative agency
is acting in a judicial capacity .. . ." Cf. Stillians v. Iowa, 843 F.2d 276, 281 n.3
(8th Cir. 1988); Yashon v. Hunt, 825 F.2d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir. 1987); Pullar v.
Upjohn Health Care Serv. Inc., 21 Ohio App. 3d 288, 488 N.E.2d 486 (1984).
144 Cf. 2 F. COOPER, infra note 151, at 503.
145 See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). The Court in McElroy
stated, "[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with
a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." Id. at 895. See also
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (determination of process required in
an administrative proceeding requires analysis of interests affected).
146 See infra note 186.
147 See infra notes 242-48 and accompanying text.
,41 See A. VESTAL, supra note 11, at 62-67.
140 See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text.
150 See A. VESTAL supra note 11 at 14-15. Professor Vestal sets out a list of
variables to be taken into account when applying res judicata.
151 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4 (1965).
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administrative agencies are statutorily defined 52 and apply to most fed-
eral agencies. 153 States may not have a statute which defines the proce-
dures to be used by all of its agencies. Ohio, for instance, has a statute
which prescribes procedures which many of its administrative agencies
must follow.54 However, Ohio's statute is not as comprehensive in ap-
plication as its federal counterpart. In Ohio, for the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) to be applicable, the adjudication must take place before
the highest authority of the agency involved. 55 Thus, a large percent-ige
of administrative adjudication in Ohio falls outside the purview o' a
uniform statute because much of Ohio's administrative adjudication takes
place at a lower level of review. 156
When the Ohio APA does apply in a given situation, the procedures
which it entails do have similarity to those used in a court. The statute
requires an opportunity for a hearing 57 and notice'518 of the hearing before
the decision is rendered. In a court of law, opportunity to be heard and
notice of the hearing are benchmarks of a fair trial.5 9 The Ohio act also
gives the various parties to the adjudication the right to be represented
by counsel if they so choose. 160 Additionally, the person who has the
responsibility to hear the administrative adjudication is a licensed at-
torney.16 ' Similarly, the litigants in a judicial proceeding conducted in a
court of law have a right to be represented by counsel 162 and the trier of
fact in such a situation must also be a licensed attorney. 6 In Ohio, in
situations where the state's APA does not apply, the procedures which
152 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982).
15. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1982). The agencies covered by the federal adminis-
trative procedures act include every authority of the United States Government
with the exceptions of the Congress, U.S. courts, governments of territorial pos-
sessions of the U.S., and the government of the District of Columbia. Id.
,4 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 119.01 - 119.13 (Baldwin 1987). See generally
Note, A Survey of Principal Procedural Elements Among State Administrative
Procedure Acts, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 281 (1973); Comment, Administrative Ad-judications: An Overview of the Existing Models and Their Failure to Achieve
Uniformity and a Proposal for a Uniform Adjudicatory Framework, 46 OnIO ST.
L.J. 354 (1985) [hereinafter Administrative Adjudications].
'5' OHIO REV- CODE ANN. § 119.01(d) (Baldwin 1987). Under section 119.01(d)
adjudication is defined as a "determination by the highest or ultimate authority
of an agency .... " Id.
156 A large percentage of administrative adjudications do not get to the highest
authority of the agency. Often a referee or an examiner will hear the claim and
issue a recommendation to the ultimate authority. See Administrative Adjudi-
cations, supra note 154, at 361.
157 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 119.06 (Baldwin 1987).
"8 Id. at 119.07.159 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
'60 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.13 (Baldwin 1987).
161 Id. at § 119.09.
l62 See S. LANDSMAN, infra note 168, at 4.
165 A judge's decisions are a product of the legal experience he has acquired
before and after taking the bench. Although there are exceptions, trial judges
tend to come from the ranks of people with a great deal of experience as trial
lawyers. This is in contrast to many countries which use the inquisitorial system,
where judging commences at the outset of the professional's work life. M. FRAN-
KEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 41-42 (1980). See M. ROSENBERG, The Qualities of Justices
- Are They Strainable?, in SELECTED READINGS JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE
1 (G. Winters ed. 1967).
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the administrative adjudication must follow are found in the statutes
which create the agency and give it power. ' " Most of Ohio's administra-
tive adjudications are not covered by a uniform statute. As a result of
the relatively small size of state administrative agencies, the procedures
they follow tend to be much less formal than those which are found in
various state and federal APAs. 65
Ohio's administrative agencies may possess some procedural elements
which are associated with adjudication in a court of law. However, the
procedures which are used generally do not approach those of an adver-
sary proceeding.'
While often criticized,16 7 the adversary system of procedure has been a
part of the United States court system since the American Revolution,168
The adversary system is characterized by a fact finder who is neutral and
passive. 16 9 In this system, the parties to the litigation provide all of the
information upon which the court will render a decision. 17 In addition,
the adversary system requires a highly structured forensic setting. The
American court system is not concerned primarily with whether they
have found the truth,'7' but is mainly interested in resolving disputes
between opposing parties.172 The adversarial system achieves this goal.
If the court system were interested in finding the truth, they could em-
power the judge to make an inquiry into the facts.' 73 By having the judge
or jury be neutral and passive, an evenhanded consideration of each case
will take place and society at large will have increased trust in the
system. 74 Requiring the parties in a judicial proceeding to present all
the evidence also serves an important function. It increases the likelihood
that the needs of the litigants, and not the tribunal, will be fully appre-
ciated.' 75 The case will be tailored toward what the litigants believe the
-A Survey of the Ohio Administrative Procedures Act 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
320 (1973) [hereinafter Survey].
165 See F. COOPER, supra note 151.
16 Administrative adjudication is concerned with the basic concepts of fair play
but does not attempt to approach the procedures of an adversarial system. For a
study of Ohio's administrative procedures see 2 0. JuR. 3d Administrative Law §
78.
167 The opponents of the adversarial system maintain that it places too high a
value on winning. This leads to excessive partisanship which can frustrate the
search for truth by advocates ignoring and distorting facts and confusing rather
than clarifying an issue. The opponents also argue that this system approaches
problems in a piecemeal manner directed to symptoms rather than causes. Ad-
ditional problems seen by detractors of the adversary system include the high
cost and delay, lawyer self-interest, and winner-take-all attitude which prevents
any compromise. The Role of Courts in American Society, Final Report of the
Council on the Role of Courts 92-93 (1984) [hereinafter Role of Courts].
I- S. LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 1
(1984).
169 Id. at 2.
170 See Role of Courts, supra note 167, at 88. See also S. LANDSMAN, supra note
168, at 3-4. L. FULLER, The Adversary System in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34 (H.
Berman ed. 1961).
171 See Role of Courts, supra note 167; S. LANDSMAN, supra note 168.
172 Role of Courts, supra note 167; S. LANDSMAN, supra note 168.
'"3 This type of inquisitorial system is found in the judicial systems of the
socialist states of Eastern Europe. See S. LANDSMAN, supra note 168 at 3.
174 Id.
175 See Role of Courts, supra note 167, at 72; S. LANDSMAN, supra note 168, at
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issue is, not what the court thinks it is.176
Procedural structure is also an essential element in American courts. 177
This structure allows the parties to control the situation. The control
which the parties have in a judicial proceeding is the most important
factor in characterizing a procedural system.7 It is this element of party
control which distinguishes a judicial proceeding from an administrative
adjudication. 179 The elaborate rules of evidence, 1 0 procedure"8 ' and
ethics 82 serve to diminish the opportunity for the court to engage in a
biased investigatory proceeding. Similarly, it helps further the goal of
fairness by allowing each litigant an equal opportunity to present his
case in the best way possible. 183
Courts, also, should have a good deal of political independence. 8 4
Judges should not be politically accountable in such manner as to be
susceptible to removal for not sharing the beliefs of other government
officials. Prior to any expiration of term of office, removal should occur
only for cause or by impeachment. 85
Administrative agencies do not have the attributes of the adversary
system. One of the primary reasons for the augmentation of administra-
tive agencies in the United States was the judgment that the judicial
process could not serve the regulatory needs of the nation. 8 6
In administrative adjudication, the person hearing the matter is not
neutral and passive as is the case in a court proceeding. In fact, many
administrative findings are prepared by people who did not even partic-
ipate in the hearing. 18 7 The structure of administrative agencies generally
entails that the agency itself perform the executive, legislative and ju-
dicial functions. 188 It is often essential for an agency to act in each of
176 S. LANDSMAN, supra note 168, at 4.
177 See Role of Courts, supra note 167, at 89.
178 Id.179 See Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 541, 546
(1978).
18 0 See generally FED. R. EVID.; OHIO R. EVID. In an administrative hearing,
the agency may consider any testimony offered. Only in rare cases will an agency's
decision be overturned for receiving evidence that would be inadmissible in a
court. 1 F. COOPER, supra note 151, at 381.
Il See generally FED. R. CIV. P.; OHIO R. CIv. P. Much of an administrative
agency's adjudication is done informally. It has been estimated that ninety percent
of all administrative action is accomplished in this manner. 1 K. DAvis, supra
note 1, § 1.5, at 14.
18 2 See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981).
8 See S. LANDSMAN, supra note 168, at 5.
184 Role of Courts, supra note 167, at 90.
185 Id.
1w4 See J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 23 (1978). The most dramatic
departure agencies have made from judicial norms is in authorizing an agency
to combine investigative, prosecuting, and adjudicatory functions. Id.
187 See Pershbacher, supra note 22, at 453.
188 See FCC v. Pottsville, 309 U.S. 134 (1940). The Court in Pottsville stated
that the reason administrative agencies take part in many functions "is to satisfy
the requirements of the public interest in relation to the needs of vast regions
... in the employment of facilities for tranportaion, communication and other
essential public services." Id. at 143.
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these areas, so long as there is a mechanism to handle any abuse of
discretion.8 9
The presentation of evidence in an administrative proceeding, likewise,
does not necessarily follow the model set up in a judicial proceeding. 190
Often there is no reliance on any formal set of evidentiary proceedings. 19'
The administrator of an agency may select the relevant information. He
may also set objectives and standards to reach those objectives. 192 In Ohio,
it is not uncommon for the statute creating the agency to explicitly forbid
the use of formal rules for the presentation of evidence. 193 In addition,
many of these statutes provide for the agency to perform investigatory
functions. 194
The formality that our court system requires is conspicuously missing
from administrative adjudication. The majority of an agency's adjudica-
tion is done informally. 195 Administrative proceedings, in making issue
determinations, are not structured with the same goals that characterize
a formal court proceeding. 196 Unlike a court of law, an administrative
agency is not set up for the purpose of resolving disputes among parties. 197
The purpose for which the agency exists is to effectuate policy which the
legislature deems important.198
To illustrate the extent of procedural and philosophical conditions
which exist in Ohio's administrative agencies, it is necessary to examine
one of the state's numerous agencies.
Ohio's scheme for providing unemployment benefits was created by the
Unemployment Compensation Act.199 The purpose of this statute is to
assist those who are involuntarily unemployed.200 To implement this ob-
'9 See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 151, at 17. There is a difference in attitude
between state and federal courts as to the measure of finality to be given to
agencies which combine legislative, prosecutory and adjudicatory functions. State
courts are much less inclined to allow this finality. Id. at 17-18.
I9 See id. at 389.
191 R. LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 132 (1969).
192 Role of Courts, supra note 167, at 99-100.
193 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.10 (Baldwin 1982), which provides in part:
The industrial commission shall not be bound by the usual common
law or statutory rules of evidence ... but may make an investigation
in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the
substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of
such sections.
See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.28 (Baldwin 1982) which provides that in
a fact-finding interview to determine unemployment compensation, "the admin-
istrator is not bound by rules of evidence." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.28 (B)(1)(b)
(Baldwin 1982).
194 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4123.08 (Baldwin 1982) (allowing the industrial
commission to administer paths, take testimony, conduct hearings and make
investigations); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 4141.28 (D)(2) (allowing unemployment
administrator to investigate all claims made).
191 See R. LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 116, (1969);
See also, supra note 181 and accompanying text.
198 See Pershbacher, supra note 22, at 452. See also, supra notes 167-185 and
accompanying text.
,91 For the structure and operation of administrative agencies see K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1978).
"Is See M. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 204 (1956).
'9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4141.01-4141.99 (Baldwin 1982).
200 See Nowak v. Board of Review, 150 Ohio St. 535, 83 N.E.2d 208, 209 (1948).
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jective, the statute provides for the appointment of an administrator to
head up the Bureau of Employment Services.20 1 The administrator has
duties which involve executive, legislative, and judicial functions.20 2 The
administrator has the power to adopt rules which govern the procedures
of the agency. 0 3 He also has the power to enforce rules which he has
promulgated .204
In his judicial capacity, the administrator is vested with the power to
receive, hear, and decide claims for unemployment benefits. 205 In order
for a claimant to collect unemployment benefits, an application must be
filed with the bureau. A fact finding interview is then conducted at which
time the employer and employee, after receiving at least three days notice,
may be present. 206 No formal rules of evidence or procedure are used
during this interview. Much of the information which is to be used in the
interview is received at the request of the administrator.2° The admin-
istrator or his deputy will then make a decision as to whether the claimant
is entitled to benefits. 20 8 This decision is based on prior decisions handed
down by the agency's board of review.2°9 In addition, policy ramifications
play a large role in the decisions handed down by this agency. 210 In line
with the policy of assisting the involuntarily unemployed, the bureau is
required to apply a liberal construction to the statute in favor of the
claimant. 211
This example illustrates the essential differences between a judicial
hearing and an administrative hearing. This agency, as well as other
Ohio agencies, lacks the independence from other branches of government
which is an important feature of our judicial system.21 2 Additionally, the
trier of fact in an administrative agency is not neutral and passive; rather,
he initiates a request for certain information and also may conduct a full
investigation. The fact that the bureau is predisposed to find in favor of
the claimant serves to illustrate that the objectiveness that lays at the
201 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.02 (Baldwin 1982). There is no statutory re-
quirement as to the qualifications for the position. The governor has authority,
subject to consent of the senate, to appoint whomever he sees fit.
202 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.13 (Powers of Administrator). See also
supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
20 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.13 (A) (Baldwin 1982)2 Id.
"I Id., at § 4141.13 (J).2
1
6 Id., at § 4141.28 (B)(1)(b).
207 The administrator may request any information necessary to the determi-
nation of rights to benefits. If this information is not given, the administrator
may base his decision on any information which is available. Id., at § 4141.28
(B)(1)(b).
2o OHIo REV. CODE ANN. at § 4141.28 (c).209 See id. at § 4141.28 (f). The Board of Review is established to review appeals
of the agency's decision. There are no provisions in the statute for publication of
the board's decisions or for making the decisions available to the public. See id.
at § 4141.06.210 But see, supra note 184 and accompanying text.
2 Salzi v. Gibson Greeting Cards, Inc., 61 Ohio St. 2d 35,399 N.E.2d 76 (1980);
Vespremi v. Giles, 68 Ohio App. 2d 91, 427 N.E.2d 30 (1980).
212 See Role of Courts, supra note 167, at 90.
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foundation of our system of justice is not present in an administrative
hearing.
A court, when applying administrative res judicata, must look at the
agency's decision while being cognizant of the context in which the de-
cision was rendered.2 1 3 The concern for flexibility, so as to adapt its policy
to changing conditions, may provide adequate reason to withhold res
judicata effect from an agency's determinations. 21 4
IX. STARE DECISIS
In a common law judicial system, the doctrine of stare decisis is an
essential element.216 Under this doctrine, courts will look to prior cases
in order to address issues in the instant case.21 6 Stare decisis creates
stability in the legal system.217 This stability allows a lawyer to give
sound legal advice. 218 If the law in an area is settled, the attorney has a
reasonable basis upon which to advise, enabling the client to exercise
reasonable reliance. 219
In most state agencies, there is no predilection to follow precedent.
220
The state administrative tribunals operate under the theory that they
are to decide controversies by the application of governmental policy or
discretion, not by fixed and settled rules of law. 221 Many state agencies
do not write or publish opinions, and when they do, the language used
is phrased in a statutory way with no detailed statement of facts or reason
for the decision.2 22 This process makes it difficult to determine what the
case stands for, while making it simple for an agency to move away from
a policy enunciated in a previous case.
223
21 See Allied Chem. v. Niagra Mohawk Power Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 271, 528 N.E.2d
153 (1988). The New York court, after first looking at the procedural character-
istics of the administrative agency, fashioned two additional areas of analysis in
applying administrative res judicata. First there must be an examination of the
expectations of the parties to determine the fairness of preclusion. Second, the
court is to look at the over-all context of the decision "to assess whether according
preclusive effect to a particular agency determination is consistent with the agen-
cy's scheme of administration. Id. at 277, 528 N.E.2d at 155.
214 See id. at 277, 528 N.E.2d at 158.
215 See Judge Re, Stare Decisis, Presented at a Seminar for Federal Appellate
Judges 2 (May 13-16, 1975). Davis, The Doctrine of Precedent as Applied to Ad-
ministrative Decisions, 59 W. VA. L. REV. 111, 112 (1957) [hereinafter Doctrine of
Precedent].
210 See Doctrine of Precedent, supra note 215, at 112.
217 See id. at 118, See also, The Concept of Legal Certainty: A Preliminary
Skirmish, 4 MOD. L. REV. 183 (1941).
218 Precedent also allows a lawyer to better frame arguements before the court.
He can support his own case by prior decisions in his favor and at the same time
weaken his opponents case. See Doctrine of Precedent, supra note 215, at 122.211Id. at 118.
220 2 F. COOPER, supra note 7, at 531. State courts recognize that administrative
agencies have freedom in refusing to follow their own precedents. But cf. supra
note 209 and accompanying text.
221 See J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES 35-36 (1959).
222 2 F. COOPER, supra note 7, at 532.
223 Id.
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With a state administrative agency not feeling compelled to follow
previous decisions, the attorney does not have the same ability to offer
his client a reasonable basis for advice. While this may be one of the
inherent difficulties of administrative adjudication,224 it becomes more of
a problem when the courts give res judicata effect to these decisions. If
a lawyer is presented with a client who has an administrative claim and
a potential judicial claim, he is faced with a choice of which course of
action he should undertake. If the lawyer had a reasonable view of what
the administrative tribunal would do, he would have a more solid basis
for advising his client as to which course of action should be pursued.225
The basis for decisions made by Ohio's administrative agencies, and
with state agencies in general, varies depending on the particular agency
involved.2 26 As was discussed earlier, the Ohio Bureau of Unemployment
Compensation is explicitly required to rely on decisions previously handed
down by its appellate body.227 However, other agencies, such as the Bureau
of Workers Compensation, 22 may not have any statutory mandate in this
area.
In order for a court to give res judicata effect to an issue or a claim,
the matter raised in the first proceeding must be identical to that raised
in the subsequent action.229 In recognizing this basic tenet, the Supreme
Court,230 in applying res judicata, has focused on an identity of legal
principles as a supplement to requirements of identical issues or claims.
The Court has said that when applying resjudicata, the subsequent action
must include "the same bundle of legal principles that contributed to the
rendering of the first judgment.2 2-1
When an administrative tribunal relies on a prior decision to resolve
a case, they generally rely on a decision handed down by the same or
another administrative tribunal, 232 not a court of law. Thus, the principles
which settle a dispute in an administrative adjudication are not neces-
224 Cf. K. Davis, Administrative Findings, Reasons and Stare Decisis, 38 CALIF.
L. REV. 218, 228 (1950).
225 It may be more important that the law is settled than that it is right.
However, there is also a great need for flexibility because a rationale for a rule
of law may cease to exist at some time in the future. See B. CARDOZO, THE GROwTH
OF THE LAW 2-3 (1924); Davis, Doctrine of Precedent, supra note 215, at 118. See
generally Kent, Commentaries 443 (1826).
226 Even within a particular agency it is not easy to determine to what extent
stare decisis is present. Some agencies do not have a standard policy as to when
they will and will not issue a written opinion. In addition, when the decisions
are written there is a conspicuous absence of a statement of rules or policies being
applied, thus making it extremely difficult to distinguish decisions that a party
is trying to use. 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 532 (1965).
227 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
228 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4123.01-4123.59 does not provide for the use of
prior decisions in adjudicating a claim for benefits.
29 Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598-600 (1948).
Id. at 599-600
231 Id. at 601-02.
232 See 2 F. COOPER, supra note 226, at 532.
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sarily the same legal principles which a court would apply in a given
situation. The substantive law and the burden of proofP33 in an admin-
istrative action may not reach the level of similarity required to apply
res judicata.
The Ohio courts have recognized the problem of similar legal principles
being used in different settings. 3 4 For instance, the Ohio Supreme Court
has found that the element of just cause required to justify the discharge
of an employee does not have to be of the exact same magnitude as that
which is required by the Unemployment Bureau to disqualify a dis-
charged employee from receiving statutorily provided unemployment
compensation.
235
The Court found that in the initial action, the determination of just
cause was made in the context of a contract dispute.2 6 By contrast, the
subsequent action was before the unemployment bureau.23 7 The Ohio
court determined that the unemployment bureau was not designed to
handle contract disputes.238 The court looked at the policies underlying
the formation of the agency and found that because they did not com-
prehend the adjudication of a contract dispute, the standards for decision
did not have to be the same.
23 9
With the rationale of this case being based on policy considerations and
with the policies behind administrative agencies240 being different from
those of the court system, 241 the Ohio Supreme Court should, in future
cases, refuse to apply res judicata to decisions of its state agencies.
X. INCENTIVE To LITIGATE
In Goodson v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. ,242 the Ohio Supreme
Court laid out a list of factors which a court must look at before they
should apply res judicata. Among these factors, the court listed "the
2 Cf. Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Weaver, 41 Ohio St. 2d 97, 322 N.E.2d 665
(1975). (in order for doctrine of res judicata to be appliable, the question of proof
in the two proceedings must be proven to be the same).
24 See Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Oszust, 23 Ohio St. 3d 39, 491 N.E.2d
298 (1986); Sellers v. Board of Review, i Ohio App. 3d 161, 440 N.E.2d 550 (1981)
("just cause" for discharge from Bureau of Motor Vehicles is not equivalent to
"just cause" required to deny unemployment benefits).
235 Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Oszust 23 Ohio St. 3d 39, 491 N.E.2d 298
(1986).
236 A private arbritrator determined that under the terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement the employee was discharged for "just cause." See id. at 41,
491 N.E.2d at 300.
27 Id. at 41, 491 N.E.2d at 300.
-- Id. at 40-41, 491 N.E.2d at 300.
239 The agency was formed to provide financial assistance to people out of work
through no fault of their own. The arbitrator of the contract, however, is bound
to interpret the agreement and has no authority to invoke the state's unemploy-
ment compensation laws. Id. at 41-42, 491 N.E.2d at 300.
240 See supra notes 141-214 and accompanying text.
241 Id.
242 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983).
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amount involved in such claim. '243 The amount involved takes on great
importance when a court is asked to give preclusive effect to an agency's
determination. Where damages sought in a proceeding are small or nom-
inal, a defendant may not have an incentive to litigate.244 It may be unfair
then to preclude him from defending himself in a future action where the
remedy sought is a much larger amount.
245
When viewed in the context of administrative res judicata, the concern
over what effect the amount in controversy should have may be greater
than it would be if both tribunals were of a judicial nature. In addition
to the unfairness, which may be a factor in any res judicata claim, if the
courts apply res judicata to an agency's decisions, it may cause the ad-
ministrative system to slow down due to claimants and defendants feeling
compelled to litigate every administrative claim with increased vigor.
246
By forcing parties to litigate their administrative claims in this manner,
other problems may occur. For instance, in a situation where an employee
is seeking workers compensation or unemployment benefits, the defend-
ant employer may be represented by legal counsel whereas the employee
may be forced, for financial reasons, to go unrepresented.
2 47
An administrative agency is set up to further policy goals of a govern-
ment and to do so requires informal operations and expediency. 248 The
amounts which are involved are small in comparison with those which
are potentially available in a court proceeding. To allow an agency's
decision to be res judicata under such circumstances would be contrary
to the requirement of fairness which is essential for the application of
res judicata.
4 The Goodson court stated:
There are the tangible as well as the intangible, elements which
have their meaningful effect upon the result of any cause, the nature
of the claim and the claimants, as well as the nature of the defendant;
the amount involved in such claim; the manner of the advocacy, often
depending upon the amounts involved is such cause; the philosophical
elements surrounding the cause; the agreed settlement, if any, in the
matter ... and the unwillingness to appeal a verdict, if such would
not be feasible.
Id. at 201, 443 N.E.2d at 986.
24 See Parklane Hosiery Co., v. Shore 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979) (if defendant
is sued for small or nominal damages, he may have little incentive to defend
vigorously).
245 See Mutuality Is a Requirement for the Use of Collateral Estoppel in Ohio,
and in the Absence of Mutuality There May Be No Collateral Estoppel in the
Relitigation of Design Issues Relating to Mass Produced Products-Goodson v.
McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983). 52 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1083 (1983).
24-6 See, e.g., Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1284 (9th
Cir. 1986).
247 Id. at 1284.
248 See 2 F. COOPER, supra note 151.
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XI. CONCLUSION
Res judicata is a legal doctrine designed to give finality to the litigation
of claims or issues. When applied by a court to a decision rendered pre-
viously by another court, the doctrine works equitably. It allows the
parties to structure their legal strategy with full awareness of the con-
sequences. A litigant knows that once a court renders a decision, he will
forever be precluded from bringing the action, or litigating the issue
again, thus giving him incentive to litigate the matter. When a court
applies res judicata to decisions of a prior court, a certain amount of
consistency is present. Both adjudicative bodies were established with
the same goal in mind- settlement of disputes. In addition, both tribunals
in this situation apply the same principles to arrive at a decision.
When a court applies res judicata to a decision rendered by an admin-
istrative agency, the situation is entirely different. The ad-hoc basis on
which courts have applied administrative res judicata places a potential
claimant on tenuous ground. It is difficult to develop a legal strategy if
it cannot be determined before-hand what the consequences of a particular
choice are. Additionally, administrative agencies and courts are not set
up with the same policy objectives, nor do they base their decisions on
the same standards.
Ohio courts when asked to apply administrative res judicata have had
a difficult time. In the future, Ohio's courts should refuse to give res
judicata effect to decisions rendered by the states' administrative agen-
cies. This result takes into consideration the inherent differences between
administrative agencies and courts of law.
RANDY J. HART
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